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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
LEEANN NAY, individually and 
as personal representative for 
MATTHEW and MERISSA NAY, the 
heirs of ROBERT NAY; and 
VIRGINIA NAY, individually and 
as personal representative for 
CONNIE WHEELER, CAROLYN 
GALLEGHER, JOAN NAY and JALYNN 
NAY, the heirs of WAYNE NAY, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants 
vs. 
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, 
GMC TRUCK DIVISION, 
Defendant/Appellee 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from a final judgment of the District Court 
in a civil case. The Supreme Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the District Court err in granting appellee's motion 
for directed verdict? 
In reviewing a directed verdict, the court "roust examine the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the losing party." Manage-




stone Pines, Inc.. 652 P.2d 896, 898 (Utah 1982). A directed ver-
dict or a judgment notwithstanding the verdict is appropriate in 
a case whenever the party against whom the motion is asserted has 
failed to offer substantial evidence in support of any element of 
its claim upon which it bears the burden of proof. Taylor v. Keith 
O'Brien. Inc.. 537 P.2d 1022 (Utah 1975). 
2. The trial court concluded that a 1973 recall of passen-
ger cars did not involve a substantially similar design to that of 
the pickup truck involved in this accident and was therefore 
irrelevant, and that the potential prejudicial effect of the 
evidence outweighed any possible probative value. (R. 290-92.) 
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of 
the recall on that basis? 
The admissibility of evidence is a question of law committed 
to the sound discretion of the trial court. Rule 104(a), Utah 
Rules of Evidence. The court's ruling may be reversed only if that 
discretion was abused, State v. Bartley. 784 P.2d 1231, 1237 (Utah 
App. 1989), and then only if admission of the evidence would have 
had a substantial likelihood of bringing about a different result. 
Hill v. Hartoa. 658 P.2d 1206, 1208 (Utah 1983). 
3. Did the trial court err in requiring plaintiffs to order 
and pay for transcripts of the cross-examination of their expert 
witnesses, and transcripts of other evidence relevant to the issues 
they raise on appeal, for inclusion in the record on appeal? 
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There is no Utah law establishing the standard of review for 
this issue, but General Motors believes that the trial court is in 
the best position to evaluate the content and importance of trial 
evidence, and thus that the standard of review should be abuse of 
discretion. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence: 
Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of pre-
judice, confusion, or waste of time. Although relevant, 
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, 
or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Rule 11(e)(2), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure: 
Transcript required of all evidence regarding chal-
lenged finding or conclusion* If the appellant intends 
to urge on appeal that a finding or conclusion is 
unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence, the 
appellant shall include in the record a transcript of 
all evidence relevant to such finding or conclusion. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is a products liability action. Plaintiffs claim damages 
for personal injuries and wrongful death arising out of a single 
vehicle accident involving a 1986 GMC High Sierra pickup truck. 
(R. 129-141.) 
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Course of Proceedings Below 
The case was tried to a jury on October 1 through 11, 1990. 
(R. 383, 389-90, 415-18.) After deliberating for several hours, 
the jury reported back to the court that they were deadlocked in 
a 4 to 4 tie on the first question (liability). (R. 420, 674-75.) 
The court gave an appropriate instruction and the jury returned to 
deliberate further. (R. 674-75.) After a short time, they again 
reported deadlock. (Xd.) Rather than discharging the jury, the 
court, in effect, directed the jury to return a verdict for defen-
dant because a verdict against the party having the burden of proof 
on liability issues could be entered with fewer than six jurors 
answering no. (Id.) The jury returned a verdict against plain-
tiffs on the liability issues. (R. 421-25.) The jury was polled 
and four of the eight jurors concurred in the verdict. (R. 678.) 
In the process of ruling on post-trial motions, the court 
reversed its position, declaring the verdict defective. After some 
initial misunderstanding (R. 731-40), the court denied plaintiffs' 
motion for new trial and granted defendant's motion for directed 
verdict. (R. 744-45.) Plaintiffs appealed. (R. 747-50.) As 
required by Rule 24(f), copies of the court's Minute Entry (R. 739-
40) and Order (R. 744-45) are attached at Tabs A and B of this 
brief. 
Statement of Facts 
Plaintiffs' statement of facts recites their contentions with 
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respect to the facts surrounding the accident, but omits the evi-
dence on the critical issue of causation. They also make two mis-
statements of fact which require correction. First, they state 
that the vehicle was approaching a "slight curve" when it left the 
roadway. The photographic evidence clearly shows that the curve 
was not "slight" at all. (E.g., exhibit 32, attached to this brief 
at Tab C.) Second, they point out that the road had been seal 
coated a month or six weeks before the accident (Brief, 20), but 
fail to mention that the rocks used in the seal coat were too small 
to have jammed the steering in the manner which they alleged, and 
that in any event the road surface itself was clean (Stephens 
direct, 106; Johnson direct, 102). 
The plaintiffs alleged that a rock was lofted up from the road 
and lodged in the steering mechanism of the truck, locking the 
steering. Plaintiffs1 own expert described this scenario as "a 
highly unlikely situation." (E.g.. Manning cross, 12.)1 The 
evidence regarding plaintiffs1 theory of causation, stated in the 
light most favorable to plaintiffs, is as follows: 
The vehicle has a flexible joint ("coupling") connecting the 
steering box, which contains the gears, to the steering column. 
The flexible coupling is necessary to ensure that the gears will 
Because of the dispute over who should pay for the tran-
script, it was completed in two phases. Unfortunately, the two 
phases are not consecutively numbered. Accordingly, we refer to 
the witness1 name, portion of examination, and page number to as-
sist the court in finding its way around duplicate page numbers. 
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not be laterally loaded, and thus bind, due to any slight misalign-
ments of the column. At the flexible coupling, where the shaft 
from the steering box joins the column, the two segments are 
separated by a fibrous bushing, which helps to prevent mechanical 
noise and shock impulse from being transferred through the column 
to the steering wheel. Plaintiffs claimed that a rock lodged 
between the coupling and the end retainer nut on the case of the 
steering gear, preventing the driver from turning the steering 
wheel to the left (had he turned to the right, the alleged rock 
would have fallen out). 
There was no dispute that, long before the truck left the 
roadway, the driver had locked the brakes and, thus, the wheels; 
all witnesses agreed there were continuous skid marks on and off 
the road. (Basye cross, 90-91.)2 With the brakes locked, the 
truck could not steer regardless of whether the steering was 
jammed—it simply slid in a straight line in the path of its 
momentum. (Stephens cross, 57.) The question was whether the 
driver had tried to steer the vehicle before he applied the brakes 
and began to skid, because having locked the brakes, he deprived 
the tires of the ability to turn the vehicle, irrespective of 
steering angle. 
2
 At page 19 of their brief, plaintiffs say that Mr. Manning 
testified that they brakes did not lock when Wayne Nay applied 
them. Mr. Manning did not so testify, and plaintiffs1 citation to 
Manning's testimony does not support their assertion. 
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At trial, all of plaintiffs' experts agreed that, if a rock 
had lodged between the flexible coupling and the end retainer nut 
and locked the steering, they would expect the turning and compres-
sion forces to leave a "witness mark" on the coupling or nut. 
(Stephens cross, 49-53; Manning cross, 11; Basye cross, 87.) Yet 
the experts also agreed that the expected witness mark was not 
present. (Manning cross, 11-12, 15-16, 23; Stephens cross, 53-
55; Basye cross, 87.) Mr. Stephens' testimony that he saw no 
witness marks is particularly significant, because he was one of 
the plaintiffs' experts and was the first person to examine, photo-
graph, and disassemble the parts. (Stephens cross, 49-53.) 
The driver was a large man, 6' 3" tall, and, although plain-
tiffs' experts made no attempt to calculate the mechanical advan-
tage in the steering system, the steering mechanism gave the driver 
a mechanical advantage at the point the rock allegedly occupied of 
about 15 to 1. (Confer direct, 213-14; see Manning cross, 20-21.) 
This means that one foot-pound of force exerted at the steering 
wheel translates to 15 pounds of force at the point where the rock 
allegedly lodged, more than enough to crush the rock or dislodge 
it. The average male can easily exert 200 foot-pounds of torque 
on the steering wheel (Riede direct, 191-92), which translates to 
3000 pounds of force on the rock. When plaintiffs' experts 
manually inserted a rock in their candidate location, and allowed 
members of the jury to attempt to turn the steering wheel, the rock 
always broke or popped loose. (Manning direct, 25-26.) Mr. 
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Stephens had conducted out-of-court tests with the same results. 
(Stephens direct, 140.) Thus, there was no evidence that a rock 
could actually freeze the steering mechanism, even if there had 
been a witness mark evidencing that a rock was actually present in 
the mechanism, which there was not. 
Similarly, there was no evidence that a rock of appropriate 
shape and hardness had been present on this well-travelled haul 
road, and no credible evidence of a mechanism or a path for the 
rock to get from the road up into the gear, or a force available 
to insert it into the space between the gear box and coupling. In 
fact, the evidence was that the drafts from the coal-hauling trucks 
(the primary purpose of this road is to allow coal haulage from the 
SUFCO mine; the road dead-ends there (Johnson direct, 99)) swept 
the road surface clean. 
Finally, the court should note that the trial court had before 
it numerous items of physical evidence, including exemplars. It 
also participated with the jury in a view of a sister vehicle. 
(Tr. vol. 2, pp. 195-98.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. The court correctly directed the verdict for the defen-
dant because the plaintiffs did not present substantial evidence 
that the accident was caused by a defect in the vehicle. Plain-
tiffs' experts testified to causes of the accident which even they 
described as remote possibilities, not reasonable probabilities. 
-8-
A. The plaintiffs1 burden was not just to provide any 
evidence, however incredible, that a defect might have caused the 
accident. Their burden was M'to show that the circumstances sur-
rounding the accident were such as to justify a reasonable infer-
ence of probability, rather than a mere possibility, that the 
[alleged design defects] were responsible.•M Hersch v. United 
States. 719 F.2d 873, 878 (6th Cir. 1983) (quoting Perkins v. 
Trailco Mfg. and Sales Co.. 613 S.W.2d 855, 857-58 (Ky. 1981) 
(editing by the court)). The scenario which plaintiffs1 experts 
proposed was totally improbable: contrary to the physical evidence 
and, in some cases, to the laws of physics. 
B. Plaintiffs first had to prove that a rock of appro-
priate size would have been present on the road. Accepting the 
presence of the rock on faith, they next had to show how the rock 
could get from the road into the steering coupling. They proposed 
that a tire picked a rock of relatively precise dimensions off the 
road and, after multiple ricochets, the rock passed through a small 
opening in a heavy rubber splash shield and inserted itself with 
precisely the correct amount of force into the steering mechanism 
of the truck. One "expert" even went so far as to opine that the 
rock flew over the engine from the passenger side of the car. The 
experts admitted, however, that they did not really know how the 
rock would get to the steering coupling, and that the mechanism 
they proposed was "highly unlikely" and would occur "very infre-
quently." They were willing to adopt this hypothesis because it 
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was not impossible and they could find no other defects in the 
vehicle. In so doing, they had to ignore the obvious lack of phy-
sical evidence to support the theory, and the overwhelming evidence 
that the accident was caused by driver inattentiveness. 
C. The turning force the driver places on the steer-
ing wheel is multiplied by 15 times at the point where the rock 
allegedly inserted, yet the experts opined that the rock survived 
this force and did not break or fall out. However, plaintiffs1 
in-court demonstration of this hypothesis (which required the 
expert to carefully insert the rock into a specific area in the 
steering coupling) confirmed that the rock always breaks or falls 
out. With the exception of one totally uncontrolled test in an 
expert's driveway, all experts had the same experience. 
D. The physical evidence also contravened the rock 
hypothesis. The experts agreed that the compression force on the 
rock would leave a witness mark on the coupling where the rock had 
been, yet no witness mark was ever found. Moreover, the hypothesis 
of no left-hand steering necessarily requires that the vehicle's 
tracks as it left the road ought to project back up the roadway. 
In fact, the tracks project sharply toward the shoulder of the road 
on what would have been the driver's right (see photographs (exhi-
bits 36 and 37) at Tab E) . This suggests that the driver inatten-
tively drifted off the right hand side of the road, turned the 
truck toward the left (this is necessary to align it with the skid 
marks) and then locked the brakes. With the brakes locked, the 
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truck would not turn regardless of the steering input from the 
driver. Plaintiffs' experts admitted that they could not reconcile 
the physical evidence with their rock hypothesis. 
E. This evidence was not "substantial evidence11 by 
which a jury could have found a reasonable inference of proba-
bility that the accident was caused by a defect in the vehicle. 
It was pure speculation. 
II. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling 
that evidence of a recall of a different model vehicle for a dif-
ferent alleged defect was inadmissible. The court was familiar 
with the differences in design of the two vehicles, and correctly 
ruled that the evidence was irrelevant. The court also correctly 
exercised its discretion to exclude the evidence because any 
possible probative value the evidence may have had was outweighed 
by its unfairly prejudicial effect. 
A. The threshold requirement for admission of recall 
evidence is that the products and defects involved in the recall 
are substantially the same as the products and defects at issue. 
Even then, the evidence should be excluded if the danger of unfair 
prejudice outweighs its probative value. Jordan v. General Motors 
Corp.
 f 624 F. Supp. 72, 77 (E.D. La. 1985); Muniaa v. General 
Motors Corp.. 102 Mich. App. 755, 302 N.W.2d 565, 568 (1980). 
B. The alleged problem in the recalled units was that 
a rock could lodge between the flexible coupling and the frame of 
the vehicle, resulting in a loss of steering. This could occur be-
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cause the coupling was mounted inside the framef with a clearance 
to the frame of only 1/4 inch. Allegedly, a cross-member of the 
recalled vehicles, which was below and directly in front of the 
coupling, could bottom out on gravel roads and scoop rocks into the 
area between the coupling and the frame. 
C. In the truck at issue in this case, however, there 
is no cross member to scoop up rocks; plaintiffs1 experts theorized 
that the only way for a rock to enter the coupling area is by mul-
tiple ricochets inside the wheelwell and through the heavy rubber 
splash shield. Even if a rock could breach those barriers, the 
clearance between the coupling and the frame on the truck is 1-
1/4 inches, so the frame-to-coupling interference cannot occur. 
Plaintiffs1 experts testified to interference between the coupling 
and the end retainer nut on the steering box, not between the 
coupling and the frame. 
C. Plaintiffs argue that there was evidence of simi-
larity. The evidence to which they point is the testimony of wit-
nesses who said that the component parts of the steering are the 
same. The problem, however, was not the parts, but rather the 
proximity of those parts to the frame, combined with a specific 
mechanism for scooping rocks into the area. The trial court 
correctly ruled that the recalled cars: 
had an entirely different location and spatial relation-
ship between the flexible coupling and the frame rail 
than the one involved in this case. Additionally the 
manner and method in which gravel or rocks could be 
introduced into the flexible coupling area involve the 
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scooping of gravel by a frame cross-member. The vehi-
cle in question has no frame cross-member. (R. 291.) 
III. Rule 11(e)(2) requires the appellant to obtain tran-
scripts of "all evidence relevant to" a conclusion which the 
appellant intends to challenge. The trial court correctly applied 
this rule to require the appellants to order transcripts of the 
cross-examination of their own experts, and the testimony of other 
witnesses which bears upon the experts' conclusions. 
A. In deciding whether the plaintiffs have made out a 
prima facie case, "the evidence must be viewed as a whole, includ-
ing the status of the evidence after cross-examination." Obera v. 
Sanders, 111 Utah 507, 184 P.2d 229, 233 (1947). 
B. In reviewing a directed verdict or a judgment not-
withstanding the verdict under the substantial evidence standard, 
the appellate court looks at the evidence as a whole, not just the 
evidence elicited by plaintiffs' counsel on direct examination. 
Plaintiffs ask the court to disregard undisputed evidence which is 
directly relevant to their assertions, simply because the evidence 
did not come out in direct examination of their witnesses. The 





THE COURTfS ENTRY OF A DIRECTED VERDICT WAS 
CORRECT. 
A. Standard of Review. 
In reviewing a directed verdict, the court "must examine the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the losing party." Manage-
ment Committee of Graystone Pines Homeowners Association v. Gray-
stone Pines. Inc.. 652 P.2d 896, 898 (Utah 1982). A directed 
verdict or a judgment notwithstanding the verdict is appropriate 
in a case whenever the party against whom the motion is asserted 
has failed to offer substantial evidence in support of any element 
of its claim upon which it bears the burden of proof. Taylor v. 
Keith O'Brien, Inc., 537 P.2d 1022 (Utah 1975). In deciding 
whether the trial court acted correctly, the court must consider 
the status of the evidence after cross-examination: 
Does the evidence constitute a prima facie case of 
damage by fraudulent representations or deceit? In test-
ing the sufficiency of the evidence on motion for non-
suit, the evidence must be viewed as a whole, including 
the status of the evidence after cross-examination. 
Obera v. Sanders, 111 Utah 507, 184 P.2d 229, 233 (1947). 
Plaintiffs' burden was to prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the accident was caused by a defect in the vehicle. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-6. The "defect" plaintiffs chose to assert 
was that a rock could be lofted up from the road, enter the wheel 
well, ricochet through a splash shield, drop into the space between 
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the coupling and the gear case, not break or fall out, and deprive 
the driver of steering control over the vehicle. In order to 
prevail, plaintiffs had to provide "substantial, competent evidence 
upon which a jury acting fairly and reasonably" could find that 
plaintiffs' postulate was more probable than not. See Dairyland 
Insurance Co. v. Holder, 641 P.2d 136, 138 (Utah 1982). They did 
not do so. 
B. Plaintiffs Failed to Prove That a Defect in the 
Vehicle Caused the Accident. 
Plaintiffs called three expert witnesses in support of their 
theory: David Stephens, Lindley Manning, and Charles Basye. 
1. David Stephens. 
Mr. Stephens described himself as "a consultant in the field 
of accident and safety." (Stephens direct, 102.) He was an 
insurance claims manager for 25 years, obtained a masters degree 
in "safety" and became a "consultant." (Id.) He described his 
"mechanical experience" as follows: 
I was a service station attendant when I was 15 
years old. I've been turning nuts and bolts in some 
degree ever since. In the mid-'70's, I worked as a 
volunteer with a friend of mine who ran a board race car 
and I was his crew chief. We campaigned that car in 
California, Arizona, Utah and Colorado. I've done 
extensive work on my own personal cars, and I restore 
cars. (Id., 103.) 
Mr. Stephens was the first expert witness to inspect the vehi-
cle, about five days after the accident. (Id., 105.) He testified 
that he washed, examined, and photographed the steering coupling 
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at that time and saw no witness mark which would support the plain-
tiffs1 theory. (Cross, 53.) He also testified that he saw no 
witness marks on the end retainer nut attached to the gear. (Id., 
54, 55.) The following exchange is important because the plain-
tiffs did not retain the coupling for inspection by others: 
Q You mentioned that you were not looking for 
witness marks on the flexible coupling or the end 
retainer nut. Had there been something unusual about 
that, you would have considered it, would you not? 
A If it had been unusual, and I had also seen it, 
I probably— 
Q You're a trained investigator? 
A Yes. 
Q You did not know the cause of the accident? 
A Correct. 
Q You were looking for something in the steering? 
A Yes. 
Q And you had those parts right in your very 
hands? 
A Yes. I did. 
Q You cleaned them up? 
A Yes. 
Q And you disassembled them? 
A Right. 
Q And you photographed them? 
A Yes. 




Q And did you adjust your camera for the proper 
focus? 
A Yes. 
Q And those photographs were in good focus, 
weren't they? 
A Yes. I'm proud of 'em. 
Q I would think so. 
And the photograph showed no witness marks? 
A The photographs don't show anything that could 
show witness marks. They aren't of the components that 
would show. They're not the right angle to show witness 
marks if they had been taken. Ambiguous? I'm sorry, but 
I think I made my meaning. 
Q Had you noticed anything unusual while you were 
setting up for that very careful photography, you would 
have photographed that, would you not? 
A I would have, yes. 
Q And you saw nothing unusual? 
A I saw nothing. (Recross, 64-66.) 
Plaintiffs rely heavily on Stephens' testimony that his exami-
nation of the width of the tire tracks led him to conclude that the 
front wheels were not turned when the truck left the road. Even 
taken at face value, the testimony does not establish, or even tend 
to prove, a defect in the vehicle. The proof plaintiffs lacked was 
substantial evidence that their hypothesized mechanism for jamming 
the steering was plausible. 
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Stephens testimony regarding the tire tracks was based on two 
very subjective pieces of evidence: 1) Mr. Stephens1 observation 
of the accident scene five days after the accident, where he ob-
served that, on that day, weeds near the tire tracks did not appear 
to be bent over (Stephens direct, 135, 143-45);3 and 2) pictures 
of the accident scene, which were subject to various 
interpretations (exhibits 13, 29, 81, 90, 96-102; Riede direct, 
262-63, 270-74). (A copy of exhibit 29 is included at Tab D of the 
appendix so the court can see for itself the evidence upon which 
Mr. Stephens based his opinion.) In evaluating whether this 
testimony is meaningful, it is important to keep in mind that the 
vehicle traveled straight over the hill, so the back wheels 
traveled through the path of the front wheels. 
On cross-examination Stephens conceded that the tire tracks 
found at the accident scene showed that the right front tire had 
gone off the pavement and onto the shoulder, and had then turned 
to the left back onto the pavement a considerable distance back 
from the curve. (Stephens cross, 58-60.) In fact, photographs 
show that the truck's angle of momentum is not in a straight line 
with the roadway, but rather is at a considerable angle originating 
from the right shoulder. (Stephens1 dilemma is clearly apparent 
3
 Defendant's witness, Newell Knight, measured the tire tracks 
on the same day as Mr. Stephens. Mr. Knight testified that the 
tracks appeared to be seven to eight inches wide near the edge of 
the hill, but that they were wider back where the vehicle left the 
pavement. (Knight cross, 168; exhibit 36.) That is also apparent 
from exhibits 29 and 81. 
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in exhibits 36 and 37, copies attached at Tab E; the white tapes 
in the photos have been placed along the skid marks.) This evi-
dence suggested that the driver had inattentively drifted off the 
right hand side of the road, begun (without interference from any 
rocks) a left turn back onto the pavement, found himself going too 
fast for the approaching curve, and locked the brakes. (Manning 
cross, 19; Riede direct, 258-60) Stephens admitted: 
Q When you traced out the path of the vehicle 
going backwards up towards the crest of the hill; you 
found it, the path, to run toward the right shoulder of 
the road, did you not? 
A Yes. I did. 
Q You could not explain that, could you? 
A I didn't explain it, no. I observed it and 
considered it, and wasn't able to find an answer. 
(Cross, 58.) 
In other words, Stephens could not even reconcile his opinion with 
the physical evidence at the accident scene. 
In their case in chief, plaintiffs did not attempt to qualify 
Mr. Stephens as an expert on anything other than accident recon-
struction, yet in their brief plaintiffs look to him as an advocate 
of the stone interference theory. When asked on direct examina-
tion, "What is your opinion in regard to the stone interference 
theory?", Mr. Stephens responded simply, "Seems reasonable to me." 
(Stephens direct, 141.)4 
4
 On rebuttal, Stephens did get into the area of mechanical 
engineering. Stephens was plaintiffs' only rebuttal witness, for 
reasons which were apparent: No competent mechanical engineer 
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When asked if he had been able to duplicate the alleged 
jamming of the steering system, he replied that he had not: 
I've put, oh, more than a dozen, certainly, rocks 
in there and turned it, and tried to jam them between the 
ramp portions like in here and between the ramp and the 
notches in the ring gear. And in each case, I have 
broken the rock, or the rock has flipped out. I've never 
been able to get it so I couldn't possibly turn it. But 
I have gone through it many times. (Id., 140.) 
Finally, at the conclusion of redirect examination, Mr. 
Stephens admitted that his extensive examination of the vehicle had 
not revealed any mechanical defect: 
In spite of the fact that I've not been able to 
identify any specific, or personally identified any 
specific mechanical failure or function in the vehicle 
which caused the accident; the evidence that I have 
reviewed convinces me that it was not a driver error 
problem. (Redirect, 162-63.) 
2. Lindley Manning. 
Mr. Manning is a professional witness. He admitted to having 
made about 150 trial appearances and given 500 depositions in the 
past three years. (Manning cross, 3, 6.) His claimed specialty 
is mechanical engineering. He admitted on cross that he would give 
an opinion in most any case involving a mechanical function, in-
cluding ladders, snowmobiles, lawnmowers, washing machines, garden 
tools, punch presses, conveyor belts, elevators, and now, steering 
could espouse the theory plaintiffs were then espousing, which was 
that the alleged rock flew from the passenger side tire, over the 
engine, and into the flexible coupling. See discussion beginning 
at page 26 of this brief. 
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couplings. (Id., 4.) He also claims to be an auto accident recon-
struct ionist. (Id., 5.) 
Mr. Manning testified that he thought stone interference was 
the most likely cause of the accident, but also admitted that the 
probability of it happening was "highly unlikely." (Id., 12.) He 
testified that his opinion was based on the fact that others had 
postulated this defect and he could find no other defects (Id., 
12) ; however, he also testified that he would expect a witness mark 
on the parts (id., 11), that the parts had been disturbed when he 
saw them (id., 13), that the photographs by Mr. Stephens were 
inconclusive (redirect, 46) , and that he had not bothered to 
closely examine the photographic negatives (recross, 40). 
He also testified that he had no information on the mechanical 
advantage the steering system gave the driver and had made no 
effort to calculate it or its effect on the alleged rock or, conse-
quently, on the alleged accident scenario. (Cross, 20-23.) He did 
not know what kind of tires were on the accident vehicle, but was 
nevertheless willing to say that they would pick up a rock of the 
necessary dimensions. (Recross, 36; redirect, 41-44.) 
The steering coupling in question is located forward and above 
the center of the wheel (Manning cross, 24) and 8 to 10 inches in-
board from the inside edge of tire. (Stephens cross, 43.) It is 
separated from the wheel well by an inner fender and heavy rubber 
protective skirt ("splash shield"). (Basye direct, 207-08.) 
Manning admitted that it is not possible for the tire to pick up 
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a rock and deposit it directly on the steering coupling. (Manning 
recross, 37.) If it is even possible at all, it could only occur 
after multiple ricochets. (Id., 37-38.) 
Although Manning testified that it was possible for a rock to 
ricochet from the wheel well to the steering coupling, he was not 
aware that the Nay vehicle had the protective splash shield block-
ing the hypothesized path of the rock (Manning's opinion was based 
on examination of an older truck that did not contain the shield). 
(Cross, 24-28.) Manning simply speculated that these multiple 
ricochets must have occurred because he could find no evidence of 
any other defect (id., 12). The truth is, he presented no evidence 
of any defect at all. 
3. Charles Basye. 
Mr. Basye is an engineering professor from the University of 
Missouri who consults as an expert witness on the side. (Basye 
cross, 67-68.) He testified that the design was defective because 
of the remote possibility that a rock could bounce off the road 
into the steering coupling. "I can't tell you how frequently it 
would happen. It would be extremely infrequently. But it could 
happen." (Direct, 190.) 
Basye was the only witness to testify that he could cause the 
steering to jam by manually placing a rock between the end retainer 
nut and the flexible coupling. (Direct, 189.) The experiment, 
however, was conducted in Mr. Basye's driveway, with a stationary 
vehicle. (Direct, 185, 188-190.) He testified on cross-examina-
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tion that he had no idea what mechanical advantage the system 
afforded the driver or how much turning force was applied in the 
test. (Cross 84-85.) He did not instruct the person in the truck 
how hard to turn the steering wheel and has no idea what effort was 
made. (Id., 85.) He did not instrument the truck, although it 
would have been easy to do. (Id., 82-83.) He did not even know 
the hardness of the rock used or whether rocks in his driveway in 
Missouri are comparable in hardness to rocks that might have been 
in the area of the accident. (Id. 89.) In other words, the 
"experiment" was totally uncontrolled and the hypothesis it 
supposedly "proved" was purely speculative. 
Basye testified that, in his opinion, the accident was caused 
by a foreign object becoming lodged in the area between the flexi-
ble coupling and the end retainer nut. (Direct, 218.) Even on 
direct examination, the speculative nature of the opinion was 
apparent: 
Q Okay. Now let me ask you, well, is there one 
particular [sic] for a rock to leave the tire and get up 
into this area—is there one particular direction that 
you would believe it would have to travel to get to that 
location? 
A I cannot be that precise, Mr. Hansen, as to how 
it got there. If it was indeed a rock thrown by the 
wheel, I can't say precisely how many times it rebounded 
inside the wheel well or something else in there. I 
cannot say, no, sir. (Direct, 217-18.) 
This speculation became even more apparent when the basis for the 
opinion was probed on cross-examination: 
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Q You've done no testing at all on how a rock 
would get from the road to the gear? 
A You mean have I— 
Q Run it down a graveled road or anything like 
that? 
A No. I really haven1t. 
Q You've done no qualitative analysis of vectors 
and so forth as you used and so forth to see how many 
ricochets it would take and how you would get it from 
this point to this point? 
A No. (Cross, 86-87.) 
Q How many ricochets would it take to get a rock 
from the road surface to the coupling? 
A I can't answer that, Mr. Clegg. 
Q How many directions does it have to make if it 
flipped up in the same plane as the tire; how many 
rotations does it make to thread through that hole in the 
splash shield and into that coupling? 
A I don't know. 
Q Can it go directly from the hole in the 
coupling into the—or directly from the hole in the 
splash shield into the coupling? 
A It would happen on extremely infrequently, as 
I said earlier today, as to how many ricochets precisely, 
that is something I can't answer. I don't know. 
Q I'm asking you though, can it come in a direct 
line through the splash shield into the coupling— 
A Yes. 
Q —without ricocheting inside of the frame area? 
A What are you asking me? 




Q From the hole you're talking about into the 
coupling? 
A Yes. 
Q And where is it going to hit in the— 
A I don't know. I said I think and I think this 
is the most probable cause of this accident, a foreign 
object, where in the geometry of the clock, it would have 
lodged, I don't know. (Cross, 89-90.) 
Finally, Mr. Basye testified that he would expect to find some 
witness mark on the parts if his scenario were correct. (Cross, 
87.) He did not know what the mark might look like, had done no 
testing to try to find out (id.)/ and did not even know the hard-
ness of the materials involved (id. 89). 
4. Summary. 
The real issue in this case is how far the court must allow 
an expert witness to stretch the bounds of reality, credibility, 
and his own experience before the court can simply reject the 
plaintiffs' hypothesis as unsupported by substantial evidence. In 
this case, Mr. Stephens admitted he could find no defect but was 
nevertheless willing to opine that driver error was not the cause 
of the accident. That is not "substantial" evidence. Mr. Manning 
opined that a rock impinged the steering components because he 
could find no evidence of any other defect, not because he saw evi-
dence to support that theory. Mr. Basye's opinion was completely 
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speculative, and even he admitted that the scenario he postulated 
was highly unlikely. 
Those opinions were nothing but speculation. They epitomize 
the problem of "purchased" testimony. The physical evidence 
arrayed against them was overwhelming. No expert could duplicate 
the condition, except through manually inserting a carefully chosen 
rock between two steering components; even thenf it could not be 
made to stay there. None of the physical evidence the experts 
expected to find, and particularly the witness mark which such an 
event would obviously leave on the parts, was present. Those 
"experts" who knew the physical orientation of the parts (Manning 
did not) speculated to the most improbable of scenarios: Basye was 
willing to suppose a rock coming from the tread of the left front 
tire, with multiple ricochets culminating in the rock passing 
through a hole smaller than a person's fist and landing on the 
coupling in precisely the right place and with precisely the right 
force. 
Perhaps Mr. Stephens1 rebuttal testimony illustrates the 
problem best. He testified that a rock "tiddley-winked" from the 
inside edge of the passenger side front tire and somehow found its 
way 1) out of the wheel well; 2) under or through the right splash 
shield; 3) over or under the right frame rail; 4) into the engine 
compartment; 5) over the engine; 6) past the left frame rail; 7) 
into the critical space between the coupling and end retainer nut; 
8) lodged tightly there and did not break or fall out; 9) and 
-26-
interfered with steering. (Stephens rebuttal, cross, 263-266.) 
Such a stone's forward motion through all this would allow it to 
keep up with the vehicle's speed of 50 mph, despite no forward 
moving forces. All this had to happen within a quarter mile of the 
accident site (exhibit 29; Riede direct, 248), where the truck has 
just successfully and uneventfully negotiated a left curve, proving 
no interference at that point. (Manning cross, 12-13; Stephens 
direct, 106.) All this from an "expert" with no formal training 
in engineering or physics; in fact, his highest course in mathema-
tics was high school algebra. (Stephens rebuttal, cross, 263.) 
Is the trial judge obliged to disregard all principles of physics 
and common sense when a person is willing to proclaim himself 
worthy of opinion? 
Judge Moffat was correct in deciding that this evidence was 
not substantial and that a jury acting reasonably could not have 
believed it. Plaintiffs' burden was more than just to show a hypo-
thetical possibility: Their burden was "'to show that the circum-
stances surrounding the accident were such as to justify a reason-
able inference of probability, rather than a mere possibility, that 
the [alleged design defects] were responsible.'" Hersch v. United 
States. 719 F.2d 873, 878 (6th Cir. 1983) (quoting Perkins v. 
Trailco Mfg. and Sales Co.. 613 S.W.2d 855, 857-58 (Ky. 1981) 
(editing by the court)). As the Fourth Circuit has held: 
Permissible inferences must still be within the range of 
reasonable probability, however, and it is the duty of 
the court to withdraw the case from the jury when the 
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necessary inference is so tenuous that it rests merely 
upon speculation and conjecture. 
Ford Motor Co. v. McDavid, 259 F.2d 261, 266 (4th Cir.), cert, 
denied, 358 U.S. 908 (1958). 
Plaintiffs were required to provide substantial evidence from 
which the jury could conclude that each step in their hypothesis 
was more probable than not. Their "experts" made naked assertions, 
unsupported by any testing or any physical evidence, that the acci-
dent was caused by an alleged "defect" because they could find no 
other defects. If that is "substantial" evidence, then there is 
no case which should not go to the jury because there is no case 
in which a suitable "expert" cannot be hired. 
C. The Inability of the Jury to Agree Is Irrelevant to 
the Correctness of the Court's Entry of a Directed 
Verdict. 
Plaintiffs argue that the fact that four jurors apparently 
believed plaintiffs1 hypothesis proves that the hypothesis was 
supported by substantial evidence. They carry this argument one 
step further, asserting (incorrectly) that the court initially 
denied the directed verdict motion at the conclusion of plaintiffs1 
case in chief (he took it under advisement (R. 416)) and that the 
asserted denial precludes the court from later holding that sub-
stantial evidence was not presented. 
Plaintiffs1 position ignores fundamental provisions of the 
rules of civil procedure. If the fact that some members of the 
jury agreed with the plaintiffs were sufficient basis for resisting 
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a directed verdict, there could never be a judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict. Similarly, when a directed verdict motion is initial-
ly denied, Mthe court is deemed to have submitted the action to the 
jury subject to a later determination of the legal questions raised 
by the motion." Rule 50(b), U.R.C.P. The final sentence of Rule 
50(b) is directly on point: 
If no verdict was returned the court may direct the entry 
of judgment as if the requested verdict had been directed 
or may order a new trial. 
See Graham v. Intermountain Electric. Inc., 487 P.2d 607, 608 
(Colo. App. 1971) (directed verdict proper under Rule 50(b) when 
jury is unable to reach agreement); Hall v. Container Corporation 
of America. 189 So.2d 211, 212 (Fl. App* 1966) (upholding directed 
verdict first denied and then granted after jury announced it could 
not arrive at a verdict). 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED EVIDENCE OF 
THE RECALL UNDER RULE 403 BECAUSE THE DESIGN 
INVOLVED WAS NOT SUBSTANTIALLY SIMILAR TO THE 
ACCIDENT VEHICLE. 
A. Standard of Review. 
The admissibility of evidence is a question of law committed 
to the sound discretion of the trial court. Rule 104(a), Utah 
Rules of Evidence. The court's ruling may be reversed only if that 
discretion was abused, State v. Bartleyf 784 P.2d 1231, 1237 (Utah 
App. 1989), and then only if admission of the evidence would have 
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had a substantial likelihood of bringing about a different result. 
Hill v. Hartocr. 658 P.2d 1206, 1208 (Utah 1983). 
B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in 
Finding that the Design Involved in the Recall Was 
Not Substantially Similar to the Design of the 
Accident Vehicle. 
The trial court concluded that a 1973 recall of passenger cars 
did not involve a substantially similar design to that of the pick-
up truck involved in this accident. The court therefore ruled that 
the evidence was irrelevant; and, applying Rule 403, Utah Rules of 
Evidence, that even if relevant its potential prejudicial effect 
outweighed its probative value. (R. 290-92.) Both rulings were 
correct and either is dispositive. (Plaintiffs did not include a 
copy of the courtfs Minute Entry in their brief, so defendant has 
included one in this brief at Tab F.) 
The threshold requirement for admission of recall evidence is 
that the products and defects involved in the recall are substan-
tially the same as the products and defects at issue. Jordan v. 
General Motors Corp., 624 F. Supp. 72, 77 (E.D. La. 1985); Muniqa 
v. General Motors Corp.. 102 Mich. App. 755, 302 N.W.2d 565, 568 
(1980). Even then, the evidence may be excluded if the danger of 
unfair prejudice outweighs its probative value. Id.5 
5
 Courts have also held that a manufacturer should not be 
penalized for obeying the law and instituting a recall, for the 
same reason that subsequent remedial measures are inadmissible 
under Rule 407, U.R.E. Vockie v. General Motors Corp., 66 F.R.D. 
57, 61 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd without opinion, 523 F.2d 1052 (3rd Cir. 
1975); Landry v. Adam. 282 So.2d 590, 596 (La. App. 1973). Judge 
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The recall involved 1971 and 1972 ,fBlf cars (Caprice, Impala, 
etc.). The claim was that the clearance between the steering cou-
pling and the frame of the vehicle was too close. This allegedly 
could allow rocks to lodge between the coupling and the frame, and 
jam the steering. (See plaintiffs' brief, p. 25.) The trial court 
correctly ruled that the recalled cars 
had an entirely different location and spatial relation-
ship between the flexible coupling and the frame rail 
than the one involved in this case. Additionally the 
manner and method in which gravel or rocks could be 
introduced into the flexible coupling area involve the 
scooping of gravel by a frame cross-member. The vehicle 
in question has no frame cross-member. (R. 291.) 
The court's ruling was based on evidence that the design of 
the B cars differs in several significant respects from that of the 
pickup truck in question in this case: 
1. The steering coupling in the truck is about 1-1/4" away 
from the frame rail (R. 186; Confer depo., vol. II, p. 15; Confer 
redirect, 242-243), whereas in the B cars the coupling is mounted 
inside the frame rail, and the clearance is 1/4" to 3/8" (R. 185). 
The alleged problem which the recall was designed to fix, rocks 
Moffat adopted this view as an alternative to the views advocated 
in the text: 
The defendant herein should not be subjected to the 
prejudice likely to be attached to the information 
regarding the 1973 recall simply because it was being 
somewhat cautious in its approach to the alleged problem 
when in fact the 1973 cars involved had an entirely 
different location and spatial relationship between the 
flexible coupling and the frame rail . . . . (R. 291.) 
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lodging in the 1/4 inch space between the frame and the coupling, 
cannot occur because that space in the truck is so much greater. 
(R. 185.) 
2. The recall did not simply involve the proximity of the 
coupling and the frame. It also involved the alleged ability of 
a frame cross-member to bottom out on the road and scoop rocks 
directly into the coupling/frame area. That cross-member was close 
to the road and just ahead of the gear and coupling in the B car. 
(R. 185.) The truck does not have the ability to scoop rocks from 
the road because it does not have the necessary cross-member, and 
the steering coupling on the truck is several inches higher off the 
road than the one in the B car (Confer depo., vol. II, pp. 40, 75). 
General Motors' notification to the NHTSA (which is Exhibit C to 
plaintiffs' brief but does not appear to be part of the record in 
the court below) clearly describes the mechanism by which the frame 
allegedly scooped rocks into the coupling area and its importance 
to the decision to recall: 
When these cars are driven on unpaved road surfaces, 
particularly roads which are heavily graveled and which 
are extremely wavy, rutted or filled with chuck holes, 
at speeds which cause the car to pitch excessively, the 
front crossmember may scoop up loose stones or gravel 
from the roadway. These stones may be thrown up into the 
engine compartment. The possibility exists that one of 
these stones may lodge between the steering coupling and 
the frame and cause increased steering effort or inter-
ference with steering control of the car when the steer-
ing wheel is turned to the left. 
3. Plaintiffs' claim in the case at bar is entirely differ-
ent. Plaintiffs1 claim here is not that a rock became lodged be-
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tween the frame and the coupling, but rather that the rock became 
lodged between the flexible coupling and the end retainer nut on 
the upper rear of the steering gear box, not between the coupling 
and the frame.6 (R. 265; Basye direct, 218-19.) 
Plaintiffs rely on the affidavit of Charles Basye that the 
"Saginaw steering system used in the 1986 GMC High Sierra pickup 
truck . . . was mechanically and functionally essentially equiva-
lent to the steering system used in the [B car]." (R. 265.) Mr. 
Basye's testimony is irrelevant: The steering column and gearcase 
may be the same and perform the same steering function, but they 
are installed in entirely different positions in the vehicles, and 
the vehicles' ability to place rocks into the area of the coupling 
is different. It was these last reasons that resulted in the 
recall. 
Plaintiffs also cite Mr. Confer's deposition testimony that 
"[i]f you want to relate now to the steering gear, the coupling, 
there's no difference between the B car and the truck, they're the 
same." (Plaintiffs' brief, p. 34.) Plaintiffs' use of this testi-
mony is misleading. Mr. Confer carefully qualified his testimony, 
6
 In their brief, plaintiffs somewhat disingenuously assert 
that their claim is that "a stone was scooped into the engine com-
partment." (Brief, p. 26.) In fact, their claim is that a tire 
flipped a stone off the road and, through a series of totally im-
probable ricochets and despite the presence of intermediate ob-
structions, the stone somehow reached and lodged between the flex-
ible coupling and the end retainer nut. (Manning recross, 37.) 
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stating that "the steering gear, the coupling" are the same. In 
other words, the parts are the same. The critical issue, however, 
which Mr. Confer made abundantly clear in his deposition (and which 
was clear to Judge Moffat as well (R. 291)), is that the instal-
lation and orientation of the parts in the truck and the B car are 
totally different. The trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in this regard, and its ruling should be affirmed. 
C. Lowe v. General Motors Involved an Entirely Dif-
ferent Claim from the Case at Bar. 
On appeal, for the first time, plaintiffs place heavy reliance 
on the Fifth Circuit case of Lowe v. General Motors Corp. , 624 F.2d 
1373 (5th Cir. 1980) . Plaintiffs erroneously assert that the claim 
in Lowe was the same as the claim in the case at bar. Plaintiffs 
have misunderstood the facts and the issue in Lowe. 
It requires a careful reading of the case to discern the dif-
ference between Lowe and the case at bar. In Lowe, the plaintiffs1 
decedent was driving a recalled B car. The plaintiffs' expert tes-
tified that a rock lodged in the small space between the coupling 
and the frame, which caused the steering to jam. He further testi-
fied that, as a result of resulting fatigue and stress caused by 
the interfering stone, a tooth of the Pitman shaft fractured, which 
is what ultimately caused the vehicle to veer off the road. 624 
F.2d at 1376. The stone did not prevent the column from turning 
except when it was in contact with the frame. 
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The issue in Lowe was not evidentiary. The issue was whether 
the Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 created a private cause of 
action. The plaintiffs had argued that GMfs alleged violation of 
the Act (by having insufficient repair parts available to dealers 
and not adequately explaining the danger to owners) was negligence 
per se. The trial court rejected that claim, holding that "allow-
ing evidence of any violation by GM of the MVSA to establish negli-
gence per se was the equivalent of allowing a direct cause of 
action under the MVSA, contravening the holding of Cort v. Ash, 422 
U.S. 66 (1975)." 624 F.2d at 1376. The Circuit's ruling was that: 
[T]here was sufficient evidence submitted for the trial 
court to allow the jury to determine whether GM's recall 
campaign gave inadequate warning of the danger to 1971 
Chevrolet Impala owners and whether this was a proximate 
cause of the deaths . . . . 
Id. at 1381. No such claim was, or could have been, asserted in 
the case at bar. 
In a lengthy footnote (Brief, p. 28 n.3), plaintiffs go out-
side the record to charge that the Lowe case was similar to this 
case and that GM concealed the existence of that case in discovery 
responses. It is apparent enough from the foregoing discussion 
that the case involved an entirely different claim than the case 
at bar, and GM's discovery responses clearly disclosed to plain-
tiffs that they were limited to claims similar to the plaintiffs' 
claim here—that a rock lodged between the flexible coupling and 
the steering gear assembly (GM did not simply draw a line between 
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cars and trucks). Plaintiffs did not challenge that limitation in 
the trial court. 
However, GM feels a need to respond more completely to the 
charge. Accordingly, GM has also gone outside the record to obtain 
the affidavit of Eugene D. Martenson, one of the lawyers who repre-
sented GM in the Lowe case. The affidavit is attached at Tab G of 
this brief. Mr. Martenson explains that the issue in the case was 
not whether the recall was relevant, but whether the recall statute 
gave rise to a private cause of action (56). He also explains in 
more detail the fact that Lowe involved a claim of interference 
between the coupling and frame, not the coupling and steering gear 
assembly: 
The investigating officer and wrecker driver testified 
that they found a rock wedged and held fast in the 
coupling. The plaintiff experts opined that this rock 
rotated with the coupling and caused stone interference 
with the frame as described in the "B-Car" recall. 
It was plaintiffs1 theory that the rock precluded 
proper rotation of the coupling and, hence, the steering 
column, resulting in fatigue and eventual breakage of an 
internal gear within the steering gear box. 
When the reported decision (624 F.2d 1373) refers 
to a stone "inside the steering coupling" (p. 1376), it 
refers to a stone allegedly trapped within the rotating 
steering coupling with part of this stone allegedly 
protruding and contacting the frame of the plaintiffs1 
vehicle. 
(Affidavit, 55 4, 5, 8.) The claim is clearly different from the 
claim asserted by the plaintiffs in the case at bar. 
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D. Summary. 
Admissibility of evidence is committed to the trial court's 
discretion. The trial court correctly ruled that there was insuf-
ficient similarity between the recall and the claim in this case 
to make the recall evidence relevant at all. The trial court's 
alternative ruling, that the unfair prejudice the evidence might 
work against GM outweighed any slight probative value the evidence 
may have had, was also correct. The rulings should be affirmed. 
POINT III 
THE COURT CORRECTLY ORDERED PLAINTIFFS TO PAY 
FOR THE TRANSCRIPT OF ALL EVIDENCE RELEVANT TO 
THE ISSUES THEY RAISE ON APPEAL. 
A. Standard of Review. 
There is no Utah law establishing the standard of review for 
this issue, but General Motors believes that the trial court is in 
the best position to evaluate the content and importance of trial 
evidence, and thus that the standard of review should be abuse of 
discretion. 
B. The Court's Ruling Was Correct. 
Rule 11(e)(2), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides: 
If the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a find-
ing or conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to 
the evidence, the appellant shall include in the record 
a transcript of all evidence relevant to such finding or 
conclusion. 
The rule does not say that plaintiffs must provide all evi-
dence "supporting" their theory; rather, it requires them to 
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provide all evidence "relevant" to their theory. Accordingly, the 
Utah Court of Appeals has held: 
In essence, Rule 11 directs counsel to provide this court 
with all evidence relevant to the issues raised on 
appeal. 
Sampson v. Richins. 770 P.2d 998, 1002 (Utah App. 1989). 
Plaintiffs1 docketing statement listed the following as an 
issue on appeal: 
Did the trial court err in granting defendant's Motion 
for Directed Verdict on the issue of negligence in light 
of plaintiffs1 weighty expert witness testimony? 
In ordering the transcripts of that "weighty" expert testi-
mony, plaintiffs ordered only the direct and redirect examination 
of those experts transcribed, and failed to order the transcripts 
of cross-examination or of other "weighty" evidence which supported 
General Motors. The rule, however, requires a transcript of "all 
evidence relevant to" the court's conclusion on the issue, and 
clearly contemplates that cross examination and other evidence will 
be transcribed. 
Defendant also designated for transcription the testimony of 
Chester Johnson, Newell Knight, Jerry Confer, and Pete Riede. 
These individuals all gave expert testimony relevant to the cause 
of the accident, which is clearly relevant to the issue plaintiffs 
raise. Under Rule 11(e)(2), plaintiffs were required to order and 
pay for transcripts of their testimony as well. 
Plaintiffs misstate the standard the appellate court will 
apply in reviewing the directed verdict in this case. They say 
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the standard is whether, looking only at evidence elicited by the 
plaintiffs1 attorney, and disregarding everything else, any evi-
dence at all exists that might have supported a verdict for plain-
tiffs. That proposed standard is incorrect. The correct standard 
is whether the evidence as a whole is substantial enough to permit 
a jury, acting reasonably, to find for the plaintiffs. Management 
Committee of Gravstone Pines Homeowners Association v. Graystone 
Pines. Inc.. 652 P.2d 896, 898 (Utah 1982); Tavlor v. Keith 
O'Brien. Inc.. 537 P.2d 1022 (Utah 1975). This standard differs 
from the standard as stated by plaintiffs in that it allows the 
court to consider all of the evidence, not just the evidence eli-
cited by plaintiffs' lawyer. That is why a motion for directed 
verdict must be renewed at the close of all the evidence to pre-
serve the ability to move for a judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict. 
This is illustrated by an example from the trial of this case. 
Mr. Manning testified, in direct examination by plaintiffs' coun-
sel, to a scenario in which a rock could be lofted up from the 
road, pass from the wheel well to the engine compartment, and lodge 
in the steering. He based this opinion on studies of a 1979 model 
year pickup truck in a St. Louis case. However, in the cross-
examination of Mr. Basye, another of plaintiffs' experts, and in 
the direct examination of Mr. Riede, an employee of General Motors 
(Riede direct, 183), it was brought out that the model of truck 
which plaintiffs' decedent was driving had a heavy rubber splash 
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shield between the wheel well and the engine compartment, which 
prevents the scenario which Mr. Manning speculated could occur. 
Plaintiffs want this court to consider Mr. Manningfs testi-
mony without the benefit of the undisputed facts brought out in 
the cross-examination of Mr. Basye and in the examination of Mr. 
Riede, which make Mr. Manning's hypothesis totally impossible. 
They cannot do that. That is the reason the Taylor case speaks in 
terms of the evidence, not just plaintiffs1 direct evidence. It 
is also the reason the Supreme Court held in Obercr v. Sanders, 111 
Utah 507, 184 P.2d 229 (1947), that Mthe evidence must be viewed 
as a whole, including the status of the evidence after cross-
examination. " 
Plaintiffs chose to raise these issues on appeal. The rules 
require them, not the defendant, to provide the appellate court 
with all evidence bearing upon the factual conclusions which they 
have placed in issue. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant requests that this court affirm the decision of the 
trial court. 
DATED this #C1 day of August, 1991. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Rodney R.* Parker 
Attorneys for Appellee 
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Stephen G. Morgan 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LEEANN NAY, et al. : MINUTE ENTRY 
Plaintiff, : Case No. 880906114 PI 
vs. : 
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, : 
et al, 
Defendants. 
The Court having considered the various correspondence 
from Counsel regarding the Order heretofore signed on April 15, 
1991 entitled "Order Granting New Trial and Directed Verdict" as 
prepared by Counsel for the plaintiffs and being fully advised 
in the premises now makes this its: 
MINUTE ENTRY 
It was the Courts intention at the time of the hearing on 
the Motion for a New Trial and the defendants', then pending, 
Motion for Directed Verdict to do the following in this order. 
1. Set aside the verdict as being improper by reason of 
an insufficient number of jurors being able to arrive at a 
verdict. 
2. Grant and enter the defendants7 Motion for a Directed 
Verdict. 
NAY V GENERAL MOTORS CORP. PAGE 2 MINUTE ENTRY 
3. Deny the plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial. 
Counsel for the defendants will prepare an appropriate 
Order and Directed Verdict^ 
day of May, 1991. DATED this j 
.MOFFAT 
$ *T JUDGE 
TabB 
Third Judicial Di&irict 
MAY 2 3 1931 
H. JAMES CLEGG (A0681) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorney for Defendants 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
.. f^o 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LEEANN NAY, individually and 
as personal representative for 
MATTHEW AND MERISSA NAY, the 
heirs of ROBERT NAY; and 
VIRGINIA NAY, individually and 
as personal representatives for 
CONNIE WHEELER, CAROLYN 
GALLEGHER, JOAN NAY and JALYNN 
NAY, the heirs of WAYNE NAY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs 
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, 
GMC TRUCK DIVISION AND RON 
GREENE CHEVROLET PONTIAC GMC, 
INC. , 
Defendants. 
AMENDED ORDER ON POST-TRIAL 
MOTIONS AND DIRECTED VERDICT 
Civil No. C 88-6114 
Judge Richard H. Moffat 
It having been called to the Court's attention that counsel 
for the parties disagree on the meaning of the Order entered 
April 15, 1991 and a review of that Order disclosing some 
ambiguity, the Court hereby makes and enters the following 
Amended Order which supersedes the earlier one. Inasmuch as the 
defendant dealer was dismissed from this cause by stipulation of 
the parties, these rulings affect only plaintiffs and General 
Motors Corporation. 
It is hereby ORDERED: 
1- The jury verdict heretofore accepted is now rejected as 
defective. 
2. Defendants' motion for directed verdict in their favor 
and against the plaintiffs, no cause of action, is granted. 
3. Plaintiffs1 motion for new trial is denied. 












IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LEEANN NAY, et al, : MINUTE ENTRY 
Plaintiffs, : CASE NO. C-88-6114 
vs. : 
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, 
GMC TRUCK DIVISION 
Defendants. : 
The Court having considered the Motion in Limine filed on 
behalf of the defendant, General Motors Corporation, the 
Memorandum in Support thereof, the Memorandum in Opposition 
thereto, all Affidavits filed herein relating to said Motions 
and the total two volume depostion of Gerald Confer, and having 
heard oral argument and now being fully advised in the premises 
makes and enters this its: 
MINUTE ENTRY 
The defendant's Motion is granted as to both the question 
of the 1970, 1971, 1972 or 1973 vehicle year recall, and as to 
the fact that since 1988 certain General Motors vehicles have 
had a shield on the flexible coupling. The basis for said 
ruling is inter alia, the Courts finding that the physical 
location, and distance and spacing of the flexible coupling 
from the frame rail or any other fixed object which could cause 
a stone 
NAY V. GENERAL MOTORS PAGE TWO MINUTE ENTRY 
interference is entirely different and dissimilar from the 
reason for the early 1970's recall. The Court is of the 
further opinion that given the understanding of the public as 
to the nature and mechanism of how recalls are instituted, a 
jury could well believe that simply because the 1970 recall was 
done, there was in fact a problem that necessitated a recall. 
In actual fact that recall was voluntarily done by General 
Motors after only two claims of stone interference which may in 
fact may not have occured. The defendant herein should not be 
subjected to the prejudice likely to be attached to the 
information regarding the 1973 recall simply because it was 
being somewhat cautious in its approach to the alleged problem 
when in fact the 1973 cars involved had an entirely different 
location and spatial relationship between the flexible coupling 
and the frame rail than the one involved in this case. 
Additionally the manner and method in which gravel or rocks 
could be introduced into the flexible coupling area involve the 
scooping of gravel by a frame cross-member. The vehicle in 
question has no frame cross-member. For these and for the other 
NAY V. GENERAL MOTORS PAGE THREE MINUTE ENTRY 
reasons as set forth in the defendant's Memorandum, evidence of 
such recall will not be introduceable at the time of trial• 
As to the fact that some General Motors vehicles currently 
carry a three hundred and sixty degree circular shield around 
the flexible coupling, that likewise is not introduceable at 
the time of trial. It is clear that the reason that coupling 
has that protective device is because since 1988 in certain of 
the company's cars the steering gear box and flexible coupling 
to it were relocated, and were the same design and type as used 
in the automobiles. As they carried a shield in the 
automobiles the shield has simply been carried over into this 
design, and would have no relevance or bearing upon whether or 
not the vehicle in question should have had a shield. In fact 
prejudice again could result from that inference being 
improperly drawn by the jury, and that shouldn't be allowed 
where the post-1988 location and shielding is not by reason of 
an attempt to improve or change the situation existing in the 
steering gear box and flexible coupling as it existed in the 
vehicle involved in this case. 
TabG 
H. JAMES CLEGG (A0681) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorney for Defendants 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
LEEANN NAY, individually and 
as personal representative for 
MATTHEW AND MERISSA NAY, the 
heirs of ROBERT NAY; and Appeal No. 910244 
VIRGINIA NAY, individually and 
as personal representatives for 
CONNIE WHEELER, CAROLYN 
GALLEGHER, JOAN NAY and JALYNN 
NAY, the heirs of WAYNE NAY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, 
GMC TRUCK DIVISION AND RON 
GREENE CHEVROLET PONTIAC GMC, 
INC., 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF EUGENE D. MARTENSON 
STATE OF ALABAMA ) 
: SS. 
COUNTY OF JEFFERSON ) 
Eugene D. Martenson being first duly sworn, deposes and 
says: 
1. I am a member in good standing of the Alabama Bar and 
have personal knowledge of facts herein set forth. 
2. I was one of counsel for General Motors Corporation in 
the trial, retrial and appeal of those consolidated matters 
entitled Lowe v. General Motors Corporation and Fulford v. 
General Motors Corporation and am fully familiar with the facts 
and theories therein put forth. 
3. The vehicle involved in those cases was a 1971 Model 
Chevrolet Impala which was subject to the General Motors 
"B-Car" recall concerning possible stone interference between 
flexible coupling and left frame member. 
4. That was the claim presented by plaintiffs' counsel and 
experts. The investigating officer and wrecker driver testi-
fied that they found a rock wedged and held fast in the 
coupling. The plaintiff experts opined that this rock rotated 
with the coupling and caused stone interference with the frame 
as described in the "B-Car" recall. 
5. It was plaintiffs1 theory that the rock precluded 
proper rotation of the coupling and, hence, the steering 
column, resulting in fatigue and eventual breakage of an 
internal gear within the steering gear box. 
6. Thus, the claims in Fulford and Lowe involved substan-
tially the same accident scenario hazard as was addressed by 
the recall. One of the legal issues was whether the federal 
recall statutes and regulations gave rise to a private cause of 
action, not whether the recall was relevant. 
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7. I have reviewed plainitffs1 brief on appeal in the case 
of Nay v. General Motors, Appeal #910244, and understand plain-
tiffs allege a stone became lodged between the steering 
coupling and the gear case. This is not the same theory or 
claim that was presented in the Alabama cases above described* 
Those cases involved a claim of rock interference between 
coupling and frame as described in the recall, not between 
coupling and gear case. 
8. When the reported decision (624 F.2d 1373) refers to a 
stone "inside the steering coupling" (p. 1376), it refers to a 
stone allegedly trapped within the rotating steering coupling 
with part of this stone allegedly protruding and contacting the 
frame of the plaintiffs1 vehicle. 
9. The attached diagram shows, in ink, the position the 
stone allegedly occupied in the Alabama cases. 
Further affiant sayeth naught. 
ne D. Martenspn rgei 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 5 ^ day of August, 
1991. 
Ml ALL til U W ^ 
JOTARY PHRT.Tr V NO UBLIC
Res iding In: OjJLsU^-4trt^ t^u^AiAi 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: 
3-zt- <?4 
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*V Steering Coupl ing 
Frame 
SKETCH N o , 3 
Steering coupl ing and frame on 1971 Chevrolet Impala. 
